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ABSTRACT
The structure and organisation of the machinery of government is key to the
ambitions of political coalitions. When portfolio allocation and agencification
are a function of political choice, political volatility should also affect internal
structure of government administrations. This study tests the effects of polit-
ical turnover of individual ministers and of the political ideology of coalitions
on a dataset of intra-ministerial changes in Dutch ministries between 1980
and 2014. Findings indicate that the turnover of political heads of depart-
ments and the shifts in policy preferences between successive coalitions
indeed affects the internal structure of ministerial departments. Political varia-
bles have a strong impact, particularly changes in the left–right position of
the government. A clear pattern for how precisely politics affect the structural
design of public organisations remains absent, in spite of the robustness of
the findings. Most ministries experience significant effect of executive turn-
over, sometimes increasing the hazards of intra-organisational transitions and
sometimes increasing stability. It turns out that ministers can substantially re-
arrange their organisations in line with their policy preferences but do not
necessarily do so. Sometimes the effect of liberal ideology dominates, some-
times the effect of the policy preferences with respect to a specific
domain prevails.
KEYWORDS Structure of government; survival; organisational demography
IntroductionQ2
The structure and organisation of the machinery of government is key to
the ambitions of political coalitions for a variety of reasons. Not only
does the machinery of government form the main tool of elected politi-
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policy programmes, but it also signals the agenda and policy priorities of
the incumbent government to the public (Hammond 1986; Mortensen
and Green-Pedersen 2015; Tosun 2018). Moreover, with certain structural
designs incumbent politicians attempt to hardwire their favoured policies
and increase the transaction costs for their future opponents should they
attempt to ‘kill’ their programmes (Lewis 2002; Moe 1995). When a new
coalition gains control over the government machinery after elections,
reorganising the central government lends politicians tools to – not sel-
dom symbolically, however – herald new policies and programmes (Pollitt
and Bouckaert 2011). Finally, the organisation of central government
defines how well incumbent coalitions can steer and coordinate complex
and interdependent policy programmes (Bouckaert et al. 2010).
The study of the machinery of government has gained traction among
political science and public administration scholars in parliamentary sys-
tems. While the relationship between (conservative or neo-liberal) polit-
ical ideology and the organisation of central government was central to
New Public Management (NPM) studies (Aucoin 1986; Pollitt and
Bouckaert 2011), institutionalist analyses of the ‘machinery of govern-
ment’ emerged in the studies on Westminster parliamentary systems in
particular. These studies point at the importance of political and adminis-
trative drivers, especially the role of the prime minister and bureaucratic
(self-)interests such as bureau-shaping (Davis et al. 1999; Pollitt 1984;
White and Dunleavy 2010). In contrast to most Americanist studies, the
Westminster-oriented machinery of government studies are qualitative
case studies on the role of political drivers as regards portfolio redesign.
Though these Westminster studies acknowledge the role of political par-
ties, cabinet ministers or cabinet policy positions, they do not systematic-
ally analyse the influence of political factors on structural changes in
government bureaucracies.
Recently, political science scholars have given more systematic and
careful attention to the political dynamics at the intersection of politics
and bureaucracy. Mortensen and Green-Pedersen (2015), taking
Hammond’s (1986) basic premise that the structure of a public bureau-
cracy reflects the agenda of the incumbent coalition, examined issue
attention and parliamentary agenda-setting processes as the most import-
ant drivers of ministerial design. They examined the effects of political
agendas on ministerial reforms in Danish central government. More pre-
cisely, Mortensen and Green-Pedersen examined the creation and termin-
ation of entire ministries as a function of the length of parliamentary
debates on specific issues. They found that substantial changes in political
attention to certain issues indeed influenced the number of ministries.












































2 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
ministerial design, their study is limited to the Danish parliamentary sys-
tem where the presence of single-party minority governments allows for
models on direct effects of agenda-setting processes on the number of
ministries. Whereas Mortensen and Green-Pedersen examined portfolio
design as a function of agenda dynamics, Sieberer et al. (2019) examined
the politics of portfolio design as a function of coalition formation
dynamics. In a comparative study comprising in nine Western European
parliamentary systems, they estimated the effects of changes in the parti-
san composition of the cabinet, a change of the prime minister, a change
of cabinet policy positions, and the number of parties in cabinet on the
change between competencies among ministries or between the heads of
ministries. The authors found that the design of ministerial portfolios will
most likely change within one year after the partisan composition of the
cabinet has changed or after the appointment of a new prime minister.
Changes in the ideological position of subsequent cabinets or the number
of effective governmental parties had a negative but very weak effect on
portfolio redesign. Both studies of Mortensen and Green-Pedersen (2015)
and Sieberer et al. (2019) confirm herewith U.S. theories of structural
choice politics that the structure of central government is a function of
political logics (Lewis 2002; Moe 1995).
In our study, we aim to build further on these insights by examining
politics as the driver of changes in the structure and organisation of cen-
tral government. We will examine the effects of political change on the
structure and organisation of ministries. We look at political changes at
two levels: a change in the composition of a coalition and a change in the
party of the minister heading a ministry. In addition, we will also include
portfolio re-designs within ministerial departments. Our argument is that
when the structure and organisation of central government is a function
of political choice, this should also be the case for the internal structure
of government agencies. To this end, we look at its effects on different
levels of structural reform: not only at the ministerial portfolio level, but
also the directorates-general and sub-directorates below.
For our first aim, to estimate the effects of ideological preferences at
different levels of executive government on structural change, we have
developed models with minister-level and cabinet-level political preferen-
ces. Our minister-level measure examines the turnover of the political
executive that is heading a ministry to one from a different political party
(with, arguably, a different ideological position). The minister-level vari-
able serves as an adjustment to the existing models by accounting for the
fact that in certain cabinet models, individual ministers enjoy a high
amount of autonomy as regards the management and design of their own












































WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 3
studies by zooming in on the influence of ministers. While our variables
are causally ‘closer’ to the dependent variable than Mortensen and Green-
Pedersen (2015), we do not run the risk of overestimating the single role
of the prime minister as in the Westminster studies, and go a level deeper
than the Sieberer et al.’s (2019) study by including the individual minis-
ter level.
Next, because we realise that individual ministers do not operate only
guided by the ideological positions of their political party, we take into
account the average position of the coalition. We therefore look at the
effects of the particular ideological policy position (for instance on
expanding military policy) of the incumbent coalition on structural
changes in specific domains (ministry of Defense). Then we zoom out
further, by looking at the differences between rightwing and leftwing coa-
litions in terms of how shifts between left and right affect structural
changes of government.
For our second aim, we will focus on the politics of structure inside
central government ministries, instead of focusing merely on the structure
and government of central government. In prevailing studies, focus has
been on explaining changes at the level of entire ministries: mergers, fis-
sures, or termination of entire ministerial departments and portfolios.
Existing studies on portfolio allocation included the transfer of divisions
between ministries when new portfolios are formed or existing ones
dissolved, but they did not study the effects of political factors on intra-
departmental changes directly. There has been scant attention to the polit-
ics of structural choice that occurs inside public organisations. Ministries
may retain their names and legal status uninterruptedly over longer peri-
ods of time. Studying administrative reorganisation at the ministry level,
will therefore merely signal the persistent need of their functions, i.e.
social welfare, financial regulation, or defense. It will conceal to observers
the changes that take place under the surface of organisations, i.e.
the more subtle shifts within a policy domain. Mortensen and Green-
Pedersen (2015) and Tosun (2018) have shown that the design of
ministries indeed reflects policy changes not only by name changes of
administrative units but also by mergers or splits within ministerial organi-
sations. What is less known, is how ministerial policy preferences influence
levels below the apex of ministerial departments (see also Lichtmannegger
2019). What lies beneath, hence are the structural changes within ministries
that may be very consequential for the policy domain governed. If
Hammond ‘structure equals agenda’ is right, the political ideology of the
governing political parties should affect these structural changes directly.
The theoretical refinement, however, comes at an empirical cost. In












































4 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
limit ourselves to the case study of the Netherlands. Portfolio design in
the Netherlands is the resultant of a process of coalition and cabinet for-
mation where multiple parties are involved. Portfolios are allocated on
the basis of a mix of electoral results and bargaining among parties. As
Sieberer et al. (2019: 1) already show how ‘the makeup of ministries is
often reformed in the context of coalition formation’. Unlike some of for-
eign counterparts, the Dutch prime minister does not have the (final)
authority to decide on the allocation of the portfolio among parties and
ministers and merely acts as a primus inter pares (Andeweg 2000). Given
the combination of the facts that Dutch cabinets are subjected to the
principle of collective decision-making as well as to the principle of non-
interventionism between ministers, which lends them a substantial degree
of autonomy on matters that are exclusively within their own domain of
competence, it is a good case to study the two-level decision-making
structure with regard to portfolio allocation.
In sum, we aim to dig deeper on two fronts: First, we look at both the
effects of ideology shifts caused by turnover of political executives heading
each department, and at ideology shifts between coalitions. Second, we
argue that this influence becomes visible not only in portfolio allocation
but through transitions within Ministerial departments at the level of
Directorates-General and the sub-directorates below. To this end, we test
the effects of political turnover and political ideology at the individual
minister level on a dataset of intra-ministerial changes in the Dutch min-
isterial departments that existed between 1980 and 2014. The dataset con-
tains observation on transition events experienced by 2682 ministerial
divisions and sub-divisions – directorate generals and directorates respect-
ively – of all ministries that have existed during the period of study.1 The
structure of this paper is as follows. First, we will discuss the prevailing
literatures and formulate our hypotheses. Second, we will illustrate from
our dataset the types of intra-ministerial changes that we have studied.
Third, the design of the research, data and method, is explained. The
fourth section presents the findings and the paper ends with a discussion,
followed by a conclusion.
Political effects on ministerial design
The design of administrative agencies is a function of political choice. In
multiparty parliamentary systems, general elections are followed by the
formation of a coalition government. The game ends with the design and
allocation of ministerial portfolios among parties and the appointment of
individual office-holders to the resultant ministries. Political parties that












































WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 5
ministerial portfolios that are closest to their most preferred policy issues
(Laver and Shepsle 1994; Druckman and Warwick 2005). Incoming coali-
tions bargain over the (re-)allocation of portfolios between coalition part-
ners. After the distribution of portfolios, the parties’ leadership appoint
ministers tasked to implement their party’s part in the coalition agree-
ment within their ministries. But portfolios are not carved in stone; they
can be shaped and reshaped. Over a longer time span we can see mergers
and fissures of ministries often accompanied by changes of ministerial
names. Hence, ministries need not remain the same over a longer period;
each new incoming cabinet can reshuffle ministries, rename them and then
reorganise the units within ministries. Important determinants of this pro-
cess are changes regarding political parties’ preferences, issue and agenda
dynamics, changing cabinet ideologies, the composition of the cabinet, and
the role of the prime minister (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015;
Sieberer et al. 2019; Tosun 2018; White and Dunleavy 2010).
However, while these studies underscore the importance of political
factors, they do not systematically address the fact that structural changes
can be the outcome of the preferences of either the party of the individual
office-holder heading a ministry, or the incumbent coalition. Existing
studies conceive of the process of ministerial design as the outcome of a
cabinet formation process and neglect the autonomous space that individ-
ual ministers may have to redesign their ministries in line with the prefer-
ences of their specific party. The leadership of coalition parties delegates
the implementation of the government programme to the cabinet as a
collective actor, but individual ministers heading specific ministries have
ample discretion to fine tune the internal design of their ministries in
accordance to their parties’ programme. The assignment of ministerial
portfolios to political parties is a first step for cabinet coalitions to re-
shape governmental policies, but in order to substantially alter policies,
ministers may substantially reorganise the lower levels within a ministry
as well. The changes to ministerial portfolios may be accompanied by
changes to directorates-general and/or their subordinate divisions. These
changes can vary from name changes to entire overhauls of directorates-
general and divisions. At these levels, a minister can reorganise the
administration without parliamentary approval. Yet, these pockets of sub-
units contain the core of the policy-making machinery of ministries. It is
at those levels where the policy preferences of cabinet coalitions and indi-
vidual parties can be cast into the form of an agenda through the design
of the departmental structure (Hammond 1986). In more general terms,
the government agreement is an incomplete contract imposed on cabinet
whose details are determined by individual ministers who act as the del-












































6 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
We assume that the Manifesto’s data reflect the combined ideological
preferences of the coalition on a given policy domain central to a minis-
try. We also take the ideological preference of a political party as the indi-
cator of the agenda of the individual executive from that particular party,
when he/she starts leading a Ministerial department. To illustrate, if the
political party of a new Minister is in favour of expansion of Education
(as opposed to his/her predecessor who represents a different political
party ideology), we expect that the number of organisational transitions
(hence, its hazard rate) within the Department of Education will increase.
It is our expectation, then, that political preference changes at both the
cabinet level and at the level of the office-holder who is appointed to
head a specific ministry will affect the internal design of ministerial
departments, and not only the redesign of portfolios at the ministry level.
Hence, we will examine the relationship between political turnover at the
level of individual ministers and structural changes within ministries (cf.
Bertelli and Sinclair 2018; Boin et al. 2010; Davis et al. 1999; G€otz et al.
2018; Greasley and Hanretty 2016; James et al. 2016; Laegreid et al. 2010;
Lewis 2002; MacCarthaigh 2014, O’Leary 2015; Pollitt 1984; Sieberer et al.
2019). We start with the influence of political choice at the individual
level and zoom out to look at the effects of the coalition’s policy preferen-
ces and then the influence of the coalition’s rightwing versus leftwing sig-
nature. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1: If there is political turnover of the individual executive heading the
ministry, whereby the successor represents a different political party than
the previous minister, the hazard rate of administrative units within that
ministry will increase.
Our second hypothesis concerns the effects a change in cabinet may
have on the hazard rate of administrative organisations. We hypothesise
that the domain-specific ideological position of incoming government
coalitions is likely to be reflected in organisational transitions (i.e. name
changes, merger, split, abolition or privatisation of individual public
organisations or their sub-units) within specific Ministries.
H2: If the average policy preference of the coalition with respect to a
particular ministry’s policy domain changes from one incumbent
government to another, the hazard rate of administrative units within that
particular ministry will increase.
In line with Lewis (2002), and G€otz et al. (2015) we also expect that
some more generic ideological characteristics of government matter across
the board for all ministries. Rightwing ideology has a likely effect on
administrative survival across all Ministries, since it favours free markets,
economic incentives, economic orthodoxy and law and order (to name a












































WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 7
protectionism, nationalisation and expansion of state provisions in for
instance welfare and education (at the left side of the political landscape).
The effect is not by definition negative though, it merely implies organisa-
tional change rather than downsizing of government. Both G€otz et al.
(2015) and Greasley and Hanretty (2016) find that leftwing governments
are less inclined to terminate public organisations than rightwing govern-
ments, unless budgetary pressure increases. We therefore hypothesise that
ideology matters, either rightwing or leftwing, for the organisational haz-
ard rates in all departments.
H3: If the preferences of political parties in the coalition change from
rightwing to leftwing or vice versa, the hazard rate of administrative
organisations within ministerial departments will increase.
Machinery changes in Dutch central government
We are testing the hypotheses on a dataset of ministerial changes in the
Netherlands between 1980 and 2014. The Netherlands is a parliamentary
democracy. Executive authority rests with the cabinet. The cabinet is
chaired by the prime minister, as a first among equals, and consists of
10–20 ministers and a similar number of junior ministers, appointed by
and usually from the political parties that form a governing coalition after
the parliamentary elections. Most ministers head a ministerial department,
though some ministers do not have their ‘own’ executive organisation
(such as the Minister for Developmental Aid, who resides at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs). Ministerial portfolios are typically re-allocated and rede-
signed in the formation process of a new coalition after parliamentary elec-
tions. An important feature of the Dutch case for the present study is the
presence of ministerial autonomy, exemplified by the ‘non-intervention’
principle (Andeweg 2000). After cabinet formation and the allocation of
ministerial portfolios over the coalition parties, party leadership appoints
individual ministers to individual ministries. Ministers have discretionary
powers to reorganise their ministries without interference of other minis-
ters, including the prime minister, as long as organisational changes do not
involve transfers of units between ministries. This feature of the Dutch cen-
tral government system allows us to examine the effects of cabinet- and
minister-level changes on the structure and design of ministerial depart-
ments as two interlinked but analytically separate drivers of change.
The Dutch case is also interesting because it has a number of charac-
teristics that allow for the study of the effect of political volatility on
administrative structure. According to Sieberer et al. (2019), the
Netherlands shows a high number of Ministerial reforms when compared












































8 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
governments which makes the effect of changes in composition of govern-
ment both feasible to study and likely to occur. It has a more or less sta-
ble political landscape represented in its various coalitions. It has no
tradition of patronage, or Ministerial cabinets that make administrative
organisation likely as the result of mobility of upper-echelon staff with
every move of their political chief. Finally, its administrative reorganisa-
tion requires only Royal or Ministerial decrees (depending on level of
reorganisation), which disables the effect of veto players and makes the
relation between political preferences and administrative change more
clear and straightforward (Sieberer et al. 2019).
After national elections, ministerial portfolio reshuffles and major reor-
ganisations of ministerial departments take place when a new government
is installed. Yet, intra-ministerial reorganisations and transitions occur on
a more frequent basis. To illustrate this, we take a closer look at a par-
ticular individual department, such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Major transitions within the ministry from an energy-producing depart-
ment to a regulator of private-sector competition took place after turn-
over of political executives. The centre/rightwing coalition of prime
minister Ruud Lubbers (Lubbers I, 1982–1986) put a conservative-liberal
at the helm of the Economic Affairs Department, later succeeded by a
conservative Christian-Democrat who had a long career as civil servant in
the Ministry of Economics. In those years, organisational units such as
‘sub-directorate mining and coal’ were replaced by ‘sub-directorate
energy-saving and diversification’ and ‘energy policy and mining’. These
transitions indicated a new policy strategy regarding energy production
and use: moving away from fossil fuels and a production-orientation
towards alternative energy sources, energy efficiency and governance.
Ultimately, the policy shift visible in departmental transitions was formal-
ised in the Electricity Law of 1989, which separated production from con-
sumption (Agterbosch et al. 2004), and the Multi-Year Agreements
(Meerjarenafspraken) with industry on Energy efficiency which the
Ministry initiated in 1992 (Court of Audit 2015). This re-orientation is
further illustrated by the next round of administrative changes. A new
Minister from the liberal party D66 entered the scene in 1994 and intro-
duced novel research programmes and policy initiatives on increased
competition in the Dutch energy market (Derde Energie Nota 1995).
Around the turn of the century, again under the reign of a liberal (now
conservative) minister, changes become visible in the names and compos-
ition of DGs and sub-directorates. The Directorate-General (up until
now called ‘DG Energy’) and its sub-directorates all changed from
energy-producing sub-directorates (with illustrative names such as












































WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 9
market’, ‘energy strategy and use’, ‘energy production’). The policy-mak-
ers clearly shifted from producing to regulating. They pushed the enve-
lope even further when the DG that governed the energy market merged
with the DG regulating Telecom in 2007. These organisational units had
little else in common than the fact that they were both regulating private
market commodities.
Similar shifts are visible in the Ministry of Housing, where the
Directorate-General Volkshuisvesting (which means ‘Housing’ in the sense
of providing houses) turned into the DG Wonen (which means ‘Living’ in
the sense of residing in a house) in 2003, after a conservative-liberal min-
ister took over from a social democrat (cf. Ekkers and Helderman 2010).
Its sub-directorates meanwhile changed their names related to ‘building’,
to organisational labels such as ‘city and region’ and ‘information man-
agement’. These examples not only illustrate how political turnover goes
hand in hand with organisational restructuring, but also how liberal agen-
das on (welfare) state retrenchment become visible in changes within
Ministries (ibid.).
Research design
We test the above hypotheses across administrative reorganisations in 12
ministries of the Netherlands from 1980 to 2014. Our dataset, developed as
part of the SOG-PRO project, records the year that each organisational
entity within a ministry experiences a transition that signals an administra-
tive reorganisation for that entity (see also Bertels and Schulze-Gabrechten
2020). For the 12 ministries (see Table 1), we include all entities at both
one and two hierarchical levels below the ministry itself (directorates and
sub-directorates). The dataset contains an entry for each entity for every
year that it exists, beginning in the year of its creation (or 1980 if it existed
prior to the sampled period) and ending in the year that it experiences a
transition. Transitions comprise pure eliminations, name changes, hierarch-
ical level transfers, lateral transfers (e.g. the transfer of a sub-directorate
from one directorate to another), splits, secessions, mergers, absorptions,
and other more complex reorganisations involving several entities transi-
tioning to multiple successors.2 In our models we pool all these transitions:
any transition is considered the end of a unit phase. The main reason for
pooling is that we are here primarily interested in observable effects of pol-
itical change. Due the fact that the Dutch government does not release data
on budget or personnel sizes at the level of individual sub-units, we remain
agnostic about the weight of each transition. That is, a name change
may signal a more substantial policy change than the merger of two or












































10 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
transitions has been common practice in virtually every prevailing study of
agency termination and survival (cf. Kuipers et al. 2018). When one or
more entities emerge from a transition (as from a split, for example), we
consider these to be newly created entities. As a result of this construction,
our dependent variable for administrative reorganisation is coded zero for












































Table 1. Dutch names of ministries and CMP sources.
Ministry Names per Ministry Set Year Policy Variable5
Economic Affairs NA
Ministerie van Economische Zaken 1980–2010
Ministerie van Economische Zaken,
Landbouw en Innovatie
2010–2012
Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2012–2014
Interior




Ministerie van Volksgezondheid en
Milieuhygi€ene
1980–1982 NA
Ministerie van Welzijn, Volksgezondheid
en Cultuur
1982–1984




Ministerie van Financi€en 1980–2014 NA




Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen 1980–1994
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en
Wetenschappen
1994–2003




index (per107–per109)Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1980–2014
Social Affairs Positive welfare
position (per504–per505)Ministerie van Sociale Zaken 1980–1982




position (per104–per105)Ministerie van Defensie 1980–2014
Environment and Housing Positive environment
position (per501)Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting en
Ruimtelijke Ordening
1980–1982






Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 1980–2010
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu 2010–2014
Agriculture Positive agriculture
position (per703)Ministerie van Landbouw en Visserij 1980–1989
Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer
en Visserij
1989–2003




position (per605)Ministerie van Justitie 1980–2010
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2010–2014
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when it is coded one. The year after an entity receives a code of one it
drops out of the dataset. Figure 1 displays the number of entities per year
that experience an end transition for each ministry.
We include several independent variables to test the above hypotheses.
To test the first hypothesis, we employ a binary political turnover variable
that is equal to one for an entity if the political executive heading its par-
ent ministry comes from a different party than the political executive in
the previous year. Thus, if the political executive does not change or if
the succeeding executive comes from the same party, the variable is coded
zero. We obtained this information from the website ‘www.parliament.
com’ of the Parliamentary Documentation Centre (PDC, now independ-
ent but originally part of Leiden University – currently still partnering
with Leiden University, Maastricht University, the Documentation Centre
for Political Parties and the Centre for Parliamentary History in the
‘Montesquieu Institute’. In order to test H2, we include variables for eight












































Figure 1. Number of units experiencing an end transition by the ministry.
12 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
coalition on particular issues relevant to that ministry. These are drawn
from Comparative Manifestos Project data4 and are identical for all enti-
ties within a specific ministry. For four ministries, we did not identify
appropriate domain-specific variables from the Comparative Manifestos
Project dataset and so do not test H2 for these ministries.
In order to measure the ideological preferences of the entire govern-
ment in a given year (identical for all entities existing in that year) for
H3, we use the RILE (Right–Left) index from the Comparative Manifestos
Project by averaging the RILE score across coalition partners and using a
party’s seat share from the previous election as weights. This index esti-
mates parties on a right–left political dimension, with positive scores indi-
cating rightwing positions, and negative scores indicating leftwing
positions. For European countries without a communist past, such as the
Netherlands, this is a reasonably valid indicator of ideological position
(M€older 2016). The precise specification for each is provided in Table 1
and figures showing the annual number of transitions for each ministry
alongside changes in the main explanatory variables are included in the
Online Appendix.
To test the hypotheses, we run a series of logistic regression models
with one model for each ministry. Using logistic regression to estimate
what is essentially survival data are particularly appropriate in our case
because without knowledge of the precise date at which transitions occur,
we instead model for each year the probability that a transition occurs.
The close relationship between estimates obtained from such a model and
those obtained by a Cox regression model has been established (Efron
1988). We include an entity’s age (in years) since creation (which could
be its actual creation or the year in which a new entity succeeded from
another as a result of a name change or some other transition) and the
annual unemployment rate as control variables. Controlling for age has
been shown to reduce the bias of coefficient estimates when using logistic
regression for event history analysis (Ngwa et al. 2016). To allow for flexi-
bility in duration dependence, we use natural cubic splines for age unless
doing so does not change the results of the model, in which case we use
the more parsimonious linear duration dependence (Beck et al. 1998).
We additionally control for the effect of unemployment, in line with
previous studies (Sieberer et al. 2019). For instance, Greasley and
Hanretty (2016) state that in times of recession dismantling government
organisations is unlikely because it will increase unemployment (cf.
Kuipers et al. 2018). Because our entities are dependent on each other
hierarchically (that is, an entity may experience a transition while its par-
ent entity also experiences a transition and such a coincidence of events












































WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 13
of our estimates by the highest hierarchical level. The Online Appendix
includes correlation matrices for the variables in each model.
Results
Table 2 reports the results for the 12 models (one model for each minis-
try). Figures in the Online Appendix display the substantive significance
of all statistically significant model coefficients through predicted prob-
ability plots (plots of the predicted probability that an entity experiences a
transition against the independent variable). Most of these plots reveal
relatively modest substantive effects, with several notable exceptions indi-
cated here. In 9 of the 12 models, the effect of the political ideology of
the government (as measured by its average RILE index score) on the
probability that an entity experiences a transition is statistically significant
(p< 0.05). For eight of these models the effect is positive, indicating that
the more right on the right–left scale of the parties in government, the
greater the probability that an event experiences a transition. For both
Social Affairs and Health, the size of the effect is relatively large, with an
increase of 50% and 70%, respectively, in the probability of transition
across the range of the RILE score. In the case of Education and Culture,
the effect is negative and substantively large, indicating the opposite rela-
tionship, which is to say that the probability of transition increases the
more leftwing the parties in government (by 70% across the range of the
score). For the Environment, Agriculture and Justice ministries, the effect
is not significant. These ministries are typically held by ministers from
the same political party (nearly always liberal ministers for Justice, nearly
always Christian-Democrats for Agriculture), and so it is possible that the
influence of politics on administrative reorganisations within those minis-
tries is less volatile. Overall, however, the patterns show considerable sup-
port for H3.
Regarding the influence of political turnover of the individual executive
heading the ministry on the hazard rate of administrative organisations
(H1), we found significant effects in eight of the 12 models (p< 0.05).
The direction of the effect can be either positive or negative, indicating
that political turnover of the executive heading the ministry may be asso-
ciated with increasing the probability of entities experiencing transitions
or with decreasing this probability, a finding that is partially at odds with
the direction we expected. On the one hand, the effects of turnover for
Finance, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Defense, and Environment and
Housing are all positive and thus in the expected direction. Political turn-
over of the executive is associated with an increase in the probability that






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
effects of turnover for Economic Affairs, Education and Culture, and
Infrastructure are all negative. In these cases, turnover lowers the prob-
ability of transition, perhaps indicating the resilience of the structures in
these ministries to political interference. These effects are independent of
the effects of the government’s political ideology, however, and in all
three of these ministries, a more rightwing government was associated
with a higher probability of transition for its entities. For Interior, Health,
Agriculture, and Justice, turnover neither raised nor lowered the probabil-
ity that an entity experienced a transition. It could be that the latter three
are somewhat less partisan departments than others, because professional
identity (doctors run health policy, farmers run agriculture, jurists run
justice) prevails over party politics.
When we turn to results that are specific to a ministry’s policy area
(H2), we rely on a shift of the position of the incoming coalition towards
a particular policy area or issue. We do not test for policy area effects in
the Economic Affairs, Interior, Health, and Finance ministries because we
did not identify variables from the Comparative Manifestos Project data-
set that were specific and appropriate for those ministries, as indicated
above. For the remaining ministries, some policy area-specific results
were significant. A positive position of the coalition towards technology
and infrastructure raised the likelihood of transitions for existing entities
in the Ministry of Infrastructure. Yet, positive positions could also
decrease the likelihood of transition. For the Ministry of Education and
Culture, a positive culture position lowered the probability that an entity
experienced a transition (by 50% across the range of this variable) and
resulted in longer durations of existing units. Likewise, for entities in the
Ministry of Defense and in the Ministry of Agriculture, a more positive
position towards defense and agriculture increased organisational longev-
ity and decreased the likelihood of transition in the respective ministries.
The different directions of the policy area findings are thus somewhat
puzzling, as a positive position towards an issue may lead to either more
administrative reorganisation or to a continuation of existing structures.
Annual unemployment rates as a control variable produce significant
results for 6 out of 12 departments: a negative relationship exists between
increased unemployment and the likelihood of transitions in the minis-
tries of Interior, Finance, Education, Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Infrastructure. This means that in times of higher unemployment, the
hazard rate of these specific administrative organisations is lower.
Although the results point in the same direction (a negative influence
between unemployment and transition hazard), the subset of ministries
significantly affected does not represent a group that shares many similar-
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(2016) that governments perhaps hesitate to reorganise the public sector
when unemployment, in general, is already on the rise.
The models also controlled for age of administrative units as an inde-
pendent variable (as a linear term or using more flexible splines), and
found a positive result for 11 out of 12 ministries (all departments except
Finance). The older the administrative unit, the higher the likelihood that
it will soon experience a transition: no liability of newness within admin-
istrative organisations.
In terms of model fit, we use heat map statistics to diagnose model
misspecification problems (Esarey and Pierce 2012). In three of the mod-
els (those for Finance, Education and Culture, and Agriculture), the pre-
dicted probabilities deviate significantly from the empirical probabilities,
indicating that some important factor explaining the dependent variable
has been left out of the model. The complexity of structural change
within ministries cannot be attributed to major political factors alone.
The remaining nine models are well-specified according to this test.
Discussion and conclusion
The main finding in this paper is that the internal structure of public organ-
isations is affected by politics. We may infer that the politics of structural
choice does not halt at the boundaries of public organisations, but continues
inside public organisations themselves. The ordering of divisions and sub-
divisions, as we learned from previous studies on bureaucratic structure,
affects the way in which decisions are made in public organisations, what
outcomes are likely to be produced, and how organisational agendas are set
(Hammond 1986, 1993; Hong and Park 2019). We realise, however, that the
transitions that we observe are the transitions that political executives were
able to implement. The observed transitions are either implemented with
support of the ministerial bureaucracies or in spite of their resistance.
Bureaucratic agents have preferences for certain structures themselves and it
is likely that the transitions we were able to observe come with (unknown)
reform costs. Thus, if we would have had the data to model bureaucratic
resistance, we should have expected a moderated effect of political bargain-
ing on the internal structure of administrative agencies.
We have examined in three different ways how politics affect the
internal structure of organisations: the effects of party-political turnover
of the executive leading a Ministerial department (H1), the effects of
party-political policy positions per ministry on intra-organisational struc-
ture (H2) and the effects of rightwing ideology of the coalition govern-
ment on intra-organisational structure (H3). Our findings strongly
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liberal reform era of the 1980s, rightwing governments were most pursuant
of administrative reorganisations. In 8 of 12 ministries under rightwing
governments, the probability of a transition increased. Even when there
was no political turnover, but simply a continuation of rightwing rule,
rightwing government meant a decrease in the number of units within
these eight ministries. The decrease was either caused through disbanding,
merging, or privatising units within the ministry. The downsizing occurred
in ministries with large spending portfolios, such as Health Care, Social
Affairs, Defense, Infrastructure, and Interior Affairs. Not all ministries that
experienced a decrease in units under rightwing governments are spending
departments though, rightwing rule also affected the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance.
Second, our findings support hypothesis one, that political change, meas-
ured as a turnover between successive ministers representing different polit-
ical parties with different ideological positions, too has an effect on the
internal structure of public organisations. Though our results are robust
they are less conclusive than in the case of political ideology. We have an
almost equal share of ministries for which turnover has a positive, negative
and no effect. Only four out of the seven ministries for which we found a
significant effect of turnover experience increased probabilities of transition
as a consequence of turnover: the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Social
Affairs, Environment and Housing, and Defense. Whereas the findings on
the former four ministries are in the expected direction, turnover signifi-
cantly decreases the probability of transition at three other ministries:
Economic Affairs, Education and Culture and Infrastructure. This mixed
finding is puzzling, especially since ministries, by design and location,
are not protected against the effects of turnover. Ministries and their sub-
divisions are not insulated and their units can be terminated by executive
decree. To understand why turnover decreases the odds of transition
requires further analysis, thereby focusing on the specific (sub)divisions
within the relevant ministries: why did some change and others not?
Finally, particular policy positions of the coalition (H2) matter too for
the internal structure of ministries, but here the findings are multi-
faceted. We find groups of ministries for which a positive position
towards the (expansion of) the policy either increases or decreases the
odds of transitions; and there is a group of ministries for which the policy
position has no significant effect. In combination with the left–right ideo-
logical position of the government and the change of domain-specific pol-
icy positions, we can make certain interesting inferences. We find that
Environment and Housing and Infrastructure are ministries where the
probabilities for transitions have increased under governments that are
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housing and infrastructure, respectively. By the same token, the odds for
transition at Defense increase under rightwing governments but decrease
under governments with a positive position vis-a-vis defense. In other
words, sometimes the effect of liberal ideology dominates, sometimes
instead it is the effect of the policy preferences with respect to a specific
domain that dominates.
Overall, we can infer that political variables have a strong impact on
the internal structure and organisation of ministries. The results for the
effect of the policy positions are robust for six out of eight Ministries.
Except for the left–right position of the government, we find no clear pat-
tern for how precisely politics affect the structural design of public organ-
isations. Ministries experience significant effect of executive turnover,
sometimes increasing the hazards of intra-organisational transitions and
sometimes increasing stability. There are also ministries where we find no
effect. Ergo, minister can substantially re-arrange their organisations in
line with their policy preferences but do not necessarily do so. This, we
believe, brings us to the caveats of our current study – and the points
that we need to delve into deeper in future projects.
First, although they are from the same organisational genus, ministries
present a disparate group of public organisations due to their portfolios.
Each ministry operates in a different environment and the variation
between ministries’ environment is substantial. Ministries for example dif-
fer in terms of the nature and number of stakeholders, complexity of
technology, internationalisation, and political salience of the issue.
Second, ministries are holding companies (Hood and Dunsire 1981) as
each contains divisions that may address very different kinds of policy
issues. The structure and organisation of ministries is the outcome of par-
tisan bargaining between potential coalition partners. The final outcomes
of the bargaining process are more reflective of compromises instead of a
rational allocation of policy areas. This means that ministries may har-
bour wide-ranging policy areas with substantially different political logics.
Third, we only looked at party-political variables and have not taken
into account that bureaucratic politics may also to a large extent account
for the intra-organisation design and distribution of (sub)divisions.
Bureaucratic interests, budget allocations, and the role of bureau chiefs
therein is very important and can go quite against party-political prefer-
ences (see Boin et al. 2017; Van Witteloostuijn et al. 2018). Turf and bur-
eau-shaping politics have not been accounted for in our models.
Given the key importance of organisational structure for the realisation
of political ambitions outlined in the introduction, we argue that looking
into intra-organisational transitions will yield rich insights. We have












































20 S. KUIPERS ET AL.
junctures in the organisation’s policy environment, to outcomes of coali-
tion bargaining and to the power of bureau chiefs. International compari-
son is furthermore imperative to see if these patterns hold across different
types of political and administrative systems (Kuipers et al. 2018). This
study indicates that the study of the central government apparatus needs
to include what lies beneath.
Notes
1. Excluded were the Ministry of Generic Affairs because structural transitions
within this ministry could not be related to political preferences, and the
Ministry of Culture which existed only as a separate entity between 1980-1982.
2. Additional details about the construction of this dataset can be found in the
codebook, available on request from the authors.
3. The pooling of all transitions may thus lead to an overestimate of the overall
degree of administrative change. While this affects the descriptive overview,
its effect on the multivariate analyses is more limited because the
overestimation should be consistent across ministries.
4. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/
5. ‘Per###’ refers to Comparative Manifestos Project variable codes.
6. From 2010, environment and housing are absorbed by infrastructure.
7. From 2010, agriculture is absorbed by economic affairs.
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